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Abstract 
We motivate and describe a theory of belief in 
this paper. This theory is developed with the 
following view of human belief in mind. 
Consider the belief that an event E will occur (or 
has occurred or is occurring). An agent either 
entertains this belief or does not entertain this 
belief (i.e., there is no "grade" in entertaining the 
belief). If the agent chooses to exercise "the will 
to believe" and entertain this belief, he/she/it is 
entitled to a degree of confidence c (1 � c > 0) in 
doing so. Adopting this view of human belief, 
we conjecture that whenever an agent entertains 
the belief that E will occur with c degree of 
confidence, the agent will be surprised (to the 
extent c) upon realizing that E did not occur. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Imagine yourself participating in the following "test". At 
the beginning of the test, your host announces that an 
internationally renowned company has built a perfect 
lottery machine with a very large number of black and 
white balls inside. This machine is capable of performing 
the following experiment: emit a ball, and then (perhaps 
upon user instructions) "retake" the emitted ball. 
However, the machine has been concealed from you so 
that you do not see how many balls, black or white, are 
inside the machine. Twenty one thousand experiments 
have been run on the machine, and you are given the 
result. 
black: 
white: 
Crum.t 
10424 
10576 
Given these statistics, you are asked to make a judgment 
about the ratio of black balls versus white balls. You are 
not allowed to use pen and pencil (or computers or 
calculators or ... ) to make explicit calculations, and you 
must make up your mind within a very short time (say, in 
about thirty seconds). Thus, you are forced to use your 
own intuition to make the kind of judgment you are asked 
to make (i.e., just think in ways that you do in your 
everyday life). Before you know it, your host announces 
the answer: the actual ratio is 1 (black) versus 1 (white) -
i.e., the lottery machine contains N black balls and N 
white balls, where N may be any natural number (and you 
will not be informed of its value). Now imagine the 
extent to which you are surprised by this answer, and let 
us refer to this "extent of surprise" as 0. 
Let us start from scratch and redo the whole test (starting 
with: at the beginning of the test, your host announces 
that ... ), only this time instead of announcing that the 
answer is "1 versus 1", your host announces that the 
actual ratio is "1 ,000,000,000 versus 1". Again, imagine 
the extent you are surprised by this answer, and let us refer 
to this extent of surprise as 10 (actually, 10 should 
correspond to "x, where x approaches infinity, versus 1"; 
however, we assume the difference is negligible). 
Again, we redo the whole test. Again, the host announces 
a different answer "x versus y" (e.g., "45 versus 17''), 
where x > y, and x and y have no common divider. But 
this time, you are asked to record your degree of surprise 
on a scale of 0 to 10 (with the intuitive meaning of 0 and 
10 being what we have just noted above). In doing so, 
you are not required to use just non-negative integers. 
Any real number between 0 and 10 can be used. 
This, theoretically speaking, allows us to "calibrate" 
anyone's intuitive degrees of surprise. Once we have made 
this calibration, we can then use it as a c anonical 
measurement device to measure this very same person's 
degrees of surprise in any domain. For example, given 
the (only) information that the entity we are interested in 
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is a bird, the extent to which we will be surprised by the 
new information that the entity does not fly may be 
(judged by us to be) the same as the extent to which we 
are surprised by the "canonical answer" that the actual 
ratio is "51 versus 43". If, on a scale of 0 to 10, we 
recorded the extent of our surprise associated with "51 
versus 43" as 4, then the extent to which we will be 
surprised by the new information that the entity does not 
fly (given the only information that the entity is a bird) is 
measured 4 (or .4, if we map [0, 10] to [0, 1]). In terms 
of a notation that we describe in the appendix, we can 
denote this particular measurement of our intuitive degree 
of surprise as S([---,FL Y] I [BIRD])= .4. Similarly, if the 
extent to which we will be surprised by the new 
information that the entity flies (while previously we were 
only given the information that it is a bird) is the same as 
the extent to which we are surprised by the canonical 
answer that the actual ratio is "1 versus 1 ", then we can 
use S([FL Y] I [BIRD]) = 0 to denote this measurement. 
The measurement scheme is clearly subjective, as the 
extent of surprise associated with "x versus y" (or "not-fly 
given is-bird") is, in general, different for different people. 
Now the reader may be wondering. Why don't we just 
allow the subject to use pen and pencil (and perhaps even 
computers) to make whatever calculations he or she feels 
necessary? Because if the subject is allowed to use 
probability theory (for example) to make the 
computations, he or she could have used some 
probabilistic measure of surprise (e.g., (LjP/)!Pi, where 
Pi is the probability of the i-th outcome [Weaver, 1948]) 
to come up with his or her degree of surprise associated 
with, say, "51 versus 43". Our answer to this question is 
as follows. First of all, our purpose here is just to set up 
an (arguably) useable scheme for the measurement of 
some one's intuitive degrees of surprise. As far as this 
purpose is concerned, there is no need to "invoke" the 
machinery of probability theory here. But even more 
importantly, what we are trying to do here is to measure 
some one's intuitive degree of surprise (associated with the 
occurrence of some event) as what it is and not what it 
ought to be (according to some theory). In other words, 
we want this measurement to be descriptive in some way 
in characterizing human reasoning. After all, we are 
entitled to being surprised (according to how we reason 
and what we actually observe) without having to use some 
formal theory to calculate how surprise we "ought to be". 
Why in the world would we want to be able to measure 
(in a descriptive way) some one's intuitive degrees of 
surprise? The answer is that we find the following 
conjecture acceptable. 
The belief-surprise conjecture: the reason 
that we are surprised (say, to the extent c > 0) by 
the occurrence of an event E is that ( 1) we 
previously believed that E would not occur, and 
that (2) c was (determined by us to be) the extent 
to which we were confident in entertaining that 
belief. 
Accepting this conjecture, we are led to the following 
equation: 
S("E occurs")= Bel("E does not occur") ( 1)  
This means, for instance, our beliefs with respect to the 
above bird-fly example are Bel(([FL Y]l [BIRD]) = .4 and 
Bel(([-,FL Y]l [BIRD])= 0. And here is our thesis: As we 
may feel quite comfortable in assessing our intuitive 
degrees of surprise, we can, in effect, use these measured 
degrees of surprise to capture our intuitive notion of 
belief 
Some philosophical discussions are now in order. 
Consider the belief that "FLY is true (in the usual 
propositional sense)." Here, we are adopting the 
following view of human belief: An agent either 
entertains this belief or does not entertain this belief And 
when the agent does entertain this belief, he/she/it is 
entitled to a degree of confidence (c) in doing so. Thus, 
for example, by specifying Bel(([FL Y) I [BIRD)) = .4, 
what we mean is that "given (the truth of) BIRD, we 
entertain the belief that FLY is true, and .4 is how 
confident we are in entertaining this belief" In other 
words, we consider the act of believing something a 
categorical action in itself (either we do it, or we do not do 
it; there is nothing in between), and the uncertainty 
consists in how confident we are in exercising our "will to 
believe" and performing that act. This is, of course, only 
one way to think of human belief, as Bel(([FLY] l 
[BIRD]) = .4 can also be thought of as "given (the truth 
ot) BIRD, .4 is the extent to which we believe that FLY 
is true." In effect, what this latter view of human belief 
amounts to is a graded concept of "entertaining a belief'. 
We really have no way of telling which of these two 
views of human belief is more "correct" (there may even 
be views of human belief that are not stated here). One 
can only adopt whichever view that looks more natural to 
him/her. Nevertheless, some may find Equation 1 above 
questionable, arguing that surprise is actually a function 
of belief. This really depends on which view of human 
belief one chooses to adopt. Because if the view we 
advocate here is adopted, then Equation 1 seems perfectly 
acceptable. But if some other view of human belief is 
adopted instead, then of course Equation 1 can easily be 
refuted. So the question is again: Which view of belief do 
youfmd more natura/to adopt? And whichever view we 
choose to adopt, it may be important to bear in mind the 
following: It may be a methodological error if we try to 
pass judgment on other views of belief from the 
perspectives of our own view of belief 
This said, we now need to somehow defend our theory of 
belief (even before it is presented). As yet another 
example of our notion of belief, consider the event that 
"the restaurant run by the Chang family in Ottawa, 
Kansas, will hire a new waiter or waitress next month." 
As we know nothing about the recent situation of the 
restaurant run by the Chang family, we will not be 
surprised if this event occurs, nor will we be surprised if 
this event does not occur. In other words, we do not 
entertain the belief that this event occur (or does not 
occur), and we can denote it as Bel([HIRE]) = 0 and 
Bel([-,HIRE]) = 0. Now, this notion of belief is clearly in 
violation of the additivity axiom of Bayesian probability 
theory (i.e., Belp([HIRE]) + Belp([-,HIRE]) = I, where 
Belp stands for "probabilistic belief'). As the Bayesian 
theory is well-known for its normative claim, one might 
quite legitimately wonder whether our yet-to-be-presented 
theory of belief should even be considered a theory of 
belief at all. 
To address this issue, we need to somehow clarify what 
the word 'normative' means. According to [Collins, 1987] 
(a reasonable source of reference for the English language 
in our view), 'Normative' means creating or stating norms 
or rules of behavior. However, the normative claim of 
Bayesians may be more than just a claim of "creating or 
stating norms or rules of behavior." In the words of 
Ramsey [1931], "(anyone whose subjective belief violates 
the axioms of probability theory) could have a book (the 
so-called Dutch Book) made against him by a cunning 
bettor, and would then stand to lose in any event." In 
other words, if making an everyday or non-everyday 
decision is (setting utility considerations aside) like 
participating in a bet in which we decide about the odds 
for all possible outcomes and someone else decides about 
who bet on what, then the use of a non-probabilistic 
belief in the decision making process will have the 
potential of encountering some cunning opponent that 
make us lose, whatever the actual outcome may be 
(which, of course, is not what we want). However, the 
question here is: Is making an everyday or non-everyday 
decision like betting in the above described sense (and if 
so. who may this cunning bettor be)? This is actually a 
(very) philosophical question, and no one is obliged to say 
"yes" (and who this cunning bettor may be) or "no". If 
we decide to take the stance that decision making is indeed 
betting in the above described sense, then there is little 
doubt that our belief ought to be probabilistic (at least we 
would like it to be the case). But then, what is the reason 
or rational that we should take this stance? Apart from 
this philosophical consideration, Bayesian decision 
making also assumes that our estimation of belief and our 
estimation of utility can be made independently. This 
makes it even more difficult to accept the normative claim 
of Bayesians if we find it difficult to do so. It follows 
that if we do not take the stance that decision making is 
betting in the above described sense, then as far as 
Ramsey's argument is concerned, probability theory is no 
more normative than any other theory of belief, so long as 
this other theory of belief also serves to create or state 
norms or rules of behavior.1 
I Cox [1946] offered another justification for the 
normative claim of Bayesians. However. Cox has one axiom 
(about human belief) that we object to · the axiom that our 
belief in the complement of a proposition is a function of 
(and thus determined by) our belief in the proposition itself. 
This axiom is clearly unacceptable, so long as we choose to 
adopt the view of entertaining beliefs with various degrees of 
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Our theory of belief is developed with the specific 
intention of adopting the view of human belief we 
advocated above. It is a normative theory in the following 
sense. Given the various "fragments" of belief specified 
by the user (e.g., Bei([-,STRIKE]) = .3; Bel([RAIN] I 
[WET])= .4; Bel([-,RAIN] I [WET])= 0; Bei([PARTY]) = 
Bel([PARTY] I [RAIN]),2 our system will try to infer 
what the user's belief must be under various 
circumstances. 
Here is how the remainder of this paper is organized. In 
Section 2, we motivate and describe the use of belief 
functions [Hsia, 1991; Shafer, 1976; Smets, 1988] to 
characterize our intuitive notion of surprise. The result 
we get, then, is a theory of belief - a theory that embodies 
a completely different view of human belief as compared 
with the view that is embodied in the Bayesian theory of 
belief. Section 3 gives an illustration of how our theory 
of belief may be used in a very special context to help 
people make judgments. Section 4 contains some 
discussions. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
2 BELIEF FUNCTIONS AS A GENERAL 
FORMALIZATION MECHANISM 
Given the canonical measurement device we introduced in 
the last section, we can now use it to measure our 
intuitive degrees of surprise associated with any domain 
(theoretically speaking). But what do we do with the 
measurements we have made? One answer is that we can 
"feed" these measurements into a system or a machine and 
ask it to answer queries like "given these measurements, 
what can we say (or rather, what can you tell us) about the 
value of Bel([RAIN] I [PARTY])?" To do that, we need a 
mathematical formalism that can be used to somehow 
characterize the measurements we have made - a formalism 
that serves as a postulate in describing the "inner working 
mechanism" of our intuitive notion of surprise. 
For two reasons, we find the formalism of belief functions 
[Shafer, 1976; Smets, 1988] - in farticular, belief 
functions in the sense of [Hsia, 199 la] - attractive. The 
first reason is that we think belief functions can be viewed 
as a very general mechanism that is capable of formalizing 
various different measurements of surprise. The second 
confidence and we also use Equation 1 to measure our degrees 
of (confidence in entertaining) beliefs. It is easy to find 
situations in which we are surprised to a different extent by 
the occurrence of a different event, while being not surprised 
at all when neither event occurs. 
2While we use our canonical measurement device to 
measure the user's degrees of belief. Bayesians may use 
exchangeable bets to do so. 
3Hsia [199la] advocates a "conditioning paradigm" for 
reasoning with belief functions. In this paradigm, only 
Dempster's rule of conditioning is used for reasoning. while 
Dempster's rule of combination is considered something that 
has to be explicitly justified. 
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reason is that we think the intuitions underlying the 
belief-function formalism are in line with our intuitive 
notion of surprise. Let us first talk about the problem of 
formalizing various measurements of surprise. Consider 
the following exemplary measurements. 
1. Bei([HIRE v -,HIRE]) = 1 
I* meaning: I will be totally surprised if it turns 
out that the Changs do not hire any new one, and 
that they hire some new one. *I 
2. Bei([HIRE A -,HIRE]) = 0 
I* meaning: I will not be surprised at all if it 
turns out that either the Changs do not hire any 
new one, or that they hire some new one. *I 
3. Bei([HIRE]) = 0 and Bei([-,HIRE]) = 0 
I* Either way, I will not be surprised. *I 
4. Bei([Pacifist]) > 0 and Bel([-,Pacifist]) > 0 
I* meaning: I will be surprised if Nixon is not a 
pacifist (as he is a quaker). I will also be 
surprised if Nixon is a pacifist (as he is a 
republican). *I 
5. Bei([Pacifistl) + Bei([-,Pacifist]) < 1; 
!* meaning: I will only be slightly surprised if 
Nixon is not a pacifist (as he is also a 
republican), and I will only be slightly surprised 
if Nixon is a pacifist (as he is also a quaker). *I 
6. Bei([1EMP = med v 1EMP = low]) > 
Bei([1EMP = med]) + Bel([1EMP = low]); 
I* meaning: I will not be surprised if the 
temperature is not medium in the spring (as it 
can be low), nor will I be surprised if the 
temperature is not low in the spring (as it can be 
medium). Nevertheless, I will be surprised if the 
temperature is high in the spring. *I 
Viewing these measurements as constraints that are to be 
satisfied, we can find one or more belief functions (defined 
below) that satisfy these constraints. However, we cannot 
use probabilities or even possibilities (in the sense of 
Zadeh [1978]) to characterize these measurements, as no 
probability satisfies the third, fifth and sixth constraints 
and no possibility satisfies the fourth constraint (if Bel is 
equated with the necessity measure of possibility theory). 
One might argue that we should have used Bel([Pacifist] I 
[R " Q]) instead of Bel([Pacifist]) in the above exemplary 
measurements. However, the point here is that surprise­
measurements such as the ones above could happen (in 
particular, rationality requires that all measurements 
regarding tautologies and unsatisfiable formulas be in the 
form of the first and second measurements). With regards 
to the pacifist example, it does seem more natural to use 
conditionals. But on the other hand, we would also say 
that a reasoner should be given total freedom in deciding 
what ought to be regarded as background information (and 
stay unspecified in the notation) and what ought to be 
made explicit (by making it part of the frame (defined 
below) the reasoner is pondering over). 
Our second reason for the choice of belief functions as a 
formalization mechanism is that the intuitions underlying 
belief functions are in line with our intuitive notion of 
surprise. To elaborate, we first need some definitions. 
Let X= (XI> X2, ... , XN} be a finite non-empty set of 
variables and let 81, � • . . .  , 8N be the respective frames 
of these variables (each 8i is a finite non-empty set of 
values Xi can take; these values are mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive). Xi is boolean if 8i = (Yes, No}. 8 = 
81 x 82 x ...  x 8N. We allow the use of logical 
formulas in referring to subsets of 8, and we list in the 
appendix the formal correspondence between f, a formula, 
and [f], fs corresponding subset of 8. 
A belief function on 8 is a function Bel: 28 � [0, 1] 
which is characterized by an m-value function mBe l 
(written as "m" whenever confusions can be avoided; m is 
also called "the m-values of Bel"), where m: 28 � [0, 1] 
satisfies two conditions; 
(1) m(0) = 0, and 
(2) LA: A(;;8m(A) = 1; 
and for every subset B of 8, Bei(B) is defined as 
L A : A�Bm(A).4 A subset A of 8 is called a focal 
element of Bel if m(A) > 0. When Bel is such that m(S) 
= 1, we call Bel the vacuous belief function. 
Dempster's rule of conditioning is defined as follows. Let 
Bel be a belief function on 8 and m be its associated m­
values. Let B be a non-empty subset of 8 such that 
Bei(Bc) ;�o 1. 
"' C �; 8, if C �; B 
then m(C I B) df= LD: D� B e m(CuD) I K 
else m(C I B) df= 0, 
where K = 1 - Bel(Bc) is the normalization constant. 
(Note that for every subset S of 8, Bel(S n B I B) = 
Bei(S I B), but in general, m(S n B I B) ;�o m(S I B).) 
Very abstractly, what the above definition of belief 
functions says is this. In trying to establish Bel (i.e., to 
satisfy the specified constraints), we may decide to 
commit various degrees of intuitive supports (the m­
values) to various propositions (i.e., subsets of 8), and a 
4This definition is consistent with [Shafer, 1976]. 
Smets [1988] has a slightly more general definition (called an 
"open world" definition) in which m(0) does not have to be 0 
and Bel(A) is defmed as the swn of the m-va!ues of those non­
empty subsets of A. 
propositiOn A is allocated some intuitive support s 
whenever we find the proposition as a whole deserves this 
much intuitive support and we do not want to further 
"split" s among the elements (or rather, subsets) of A. A 
good example of this is (again) the Chang family example 
we described in the last section. For simplicity, let us 
assume we only need to worry about one variable HIRE. 
Clearly, we want the proposition [HIRE v -.HIRE] to 
receive the intuitive support 1. Nevertheless, we do not 
want to further split this intuitive support among the 
subsets of [HIRE v -.HIRE], as our intuitions satisfy 
Bcl([HIRE]) = 0 and Bel([--.HIRE]) = 0 (i.e., either way, 
we will not be surprised). What the corresponding belief­
function formalization suggests, then, is that we 
intuitively commit the intuitive support 1 to [HIRE v 
-,HIRE] and we do not commit any intuitive support to 
anything else. In practice, this may well be what is 
happening with our intuitions. Of course, there is no way 
we can generalize this particular example to all possible 
situations. Nonetheless, the definition of belief functions 
serves as a (reasonable) postulate, suggesting that we 
intuitively do commit various intuitive supports to 
various propositions. 
Given this notion of intuitively committing various 
intuitive supports to various propositions, Dempster's 
rule works as follows. Case 1 (C k: B): originally we 
committed m(CuD) = s to CuD, as we considered CuD 
as a whole deserved this much (s) intuitive support and we 
did not want to further "split" s among the subsets of 
CuD; now we learn that the actual situation is in B; as a 
result, we let C "inherit" s, as we still consider C as a 
whole deserves this much intuitive support and we still do 
not want to further "split" s among the subsets of C. 
Case 2 (C k: Be): originally we considered C the most 
specific subset of e that deserves m(C) = v; now we learn 
that the actual situation is not in Be; as our intuitions 
satisfy Bel(B I B) = 1 and Bel(C I B) = 0, rationality 
requires that w.:: make m(C I B) zero and redistribute v in 
some way; what we do then is that we redistribute v 
among the focal elements of Bel(. I B) by proportions - a 
normalization process that is similar in spirit to what the 
Bayesian rule of conditioning does. 
Is this a reasonable concept of conditioning? We think it 
is. Consider the following example. Suppose we think 
that one of Tom, Jerry and Pluto broke the window, but 
are unable to make a further distinction among the three 
(i.e., we view all three of them as equally likely suspects). 
However, we are not totally sure about it, as it is also 
possible that someone else did it. Thus, letting X be the 
one who broke the window (X=O means "other people did 
it"), we might specify our belief as Bel([X=T v X=J v 
X=P v X=O]) = I, Bel([X=T v X=J v X=Pl) = .6, 
Bel([X=T v X=Jl) = 0, Bel([X=T v X=Pl) = 0, Bei([X=Tl) 
= 0, etc. The underlying intuition, then, is that (for 
example) if we later discover that neither Tom nor Jerry 
broke the window, we will not be surprised (as it then 
means that Pluto is the suspect, and we are happy in 
being able to isolate the suspect). But if what we 
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subsequently discover is that none of these three broke the 
window (e.g., we are told by Miss White, their school 
teacher, that all three of them were cleaning the storage 
room under her supervision during the time in which the 
window was broken), then we will surely be surprised 
(with .6 being the extent of our surprise). W ith the 
assumption that the only variable we need to worry about 
is X, we can characterize the above measurements as the 
belief function that m([X=T v X=J v X=B v X=Ol) = .4 
and m([X=T v X=J v X=Bl) = .6. In tum, Dempster's 
rule will give us the expected results. Again, there is no 
way we can generalize this particular example to all 
possible situations. Nevertheless, we hope to have 
convinced the reader in some way that, so far as we are 
able to tell, Dempster's rule of conditioning seems 
"compatible" with our intuitive notion of surprise. 
Now is a good time to make clear how our notation of 
belief should be read. By specifying Bel([a]l [�]) = c, 
where a and � are logical formulas and 1 � c > 0, we 
mean either (1) or (2) or (3) below, and we do not mean 
either (4) or (5) below. 
( 1) Given that � is true, I entertain the belief that a is 
true, and c is how confident I am in entertaining 
this belief. 
(2) Given that � is true, I think a is true, and c is 
how confident I am in entertaining this belief. 
(3) Given that � is true, c is the extent to which I 
will be surprised upon realizing that a is false. 
(4) Given that� is true, c is my belief that a is true 
(or equivalently, c is my belief in a's being 
true). 
(5) Given that � is true, c is the extent to which I 
believe that a is true. 
We reject (4) as a way to read 'Bel([ a] I [�]) = c', because 
(4) is ambiguous. As such, we feel reading 'Bel([ a] I [�]) 
= c' as (4) has the dangerous potential of inviting some 
unintended view of human belief to "sneak in". This is 
definitely not how we want our theory of belief to be 
understood. In the same vein, we reject (5) as a way to 
read 'Bel([a]l [�]) = c', because we feel (5) really 
corresponds to the view of human belief that is embodied 
in the Bayesian theory of belief. For example, if one 
accepts to read 'Bel([a]l [�]) = c' as (5), then one may 
want to accept Cox' axioms, while rejecting Equation 1 in 
the last section. On the other hand, if one accepts to read 
'Bel([a]l [�]) = c' as (1) or (2), then one may find 
Equation 1 perfectly acceptable, while rejecting the one 
axiom of Cox that we object to in footnote # 1. 
Similarly, by specifying Bel([a)l [�]) = 0, we mean either 
(1) or (2) or (3) below. 
(1) Given that � is true, I do not entertain the belief 
that a is true. 
(2) Given that � is true, I do not think a is true. 
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(3) Given that B is true, I will not be surprised (at all) 
upon realizing that a is false. 
We suggest these ways of reading 'Bel([a] I fBD = 0' 
because we feel it may be unnatural to assert something 
like "given that /3 is true, I entertain the belief that a is 
true, and I have no confidence whatsoever in doing so." 
Having described what belief functions are (from the 
perspectives of surprise and also from the perspectives of 
our view of human belief), we now need to describe how 
we can use this formalism for uncertain reasoning. As we 
have already suggested at the beginning of this section, 
the basic idea is just to solicit knowledge from the user 
and then let the system make inferences according to what 
the belief-function formalism postulates to be the "inner 
working mechanism of surprise". This amounts to the 
following two-step reasoning approach. 
Step One - know ledge solicitation: the user specifies 
what his or her intuition satisfies. The result is a set of 
constraints (e.g., the constraints that Bel([-,STRIKE]) = 
.3, Bel([RAIN] I [WET]) = .4, Bel([-,RAIN] I [WET]) = 
0, and Bel([PARTY]) = Bel([PARTY] I [RAIN])). 
Step Two - reasoning: given the specified constraints, 
the system then infers properties (e.g., Bel([RAIN] I 
[PARTY]) � 0) that are satisfied by all belief functions 
satisfying the user-specified constraints. 
We acknowledge that this two-step reasoning approach is 
not as powerful as what we would like it to be. In 
particular, we have not provided a methodology which, 
when followed, would allow the user to make a systematic 
specification of what his or her intuition satisfies. 
Nevertheless, this reasoning approach serves as the 
backbone of any future, more refined reasoning approach 
we may wish to devise. There is already some progress in 
this direction. Hsia [199la], for example, suggested the 
use of the principle of minimum commitmentS on the 
part of the system to come up with answers like 
Bel([RAIN] I [PARTY]) = 0 (instead of Bel([RAIN] I 
[PARTY])� 0). This allows the system to infer what the 
user's belief is and not what the user's belief can be (which 
is what we are doing here). The principle of minimum 
commitment is not a panacea, however, as it is not 
always applicable (i.e., there may not exist a minimum 
committed belief function in the set of all belief functions 
satisfying the given constraints). Nevertheless, under this 
principle, we may be able to devise various specification 
methodologies that guarantee the existence of a minimum 
committed belief function satisfying the user-specified 
constraints. Hsia [199lc] also described a proof theory 
with belief functions being used in the corresponding 
model theory. This proof theory is at least as powerful as 
the system of Pearl and Geffner [1988]. 
5 A set of belief functions lB has a minimum committed 
element cr if and only if cr e lB and cr is such that V 't e lB, V A 
� 8, cr(A) � 't(A). 
3 A CASE STUDY 
In February of 1991, during the Persian Gulf war, the 
bombs of the Allied forces hit a bunker in which many 
civilians were taking shelter. The death toll was high, and 
one can surely imagine that the Allied forces were greatly 
surprised by the presence of a large number of civilians 
inside the bunker. To explain why the bunker was 
attacked, it was later revealed that there were two pieces of 
evidence suggesting that the bunker was used for military 
purposes. One piece of evidence was that satellite 
photographs showed that military personnels were going 
into and out of the bunker. The other piece of evidence 
was that there were military communications between this 
particular bunker and military installations elsewhere. 
Our purpose here is not to pass judgment. We mention 
this particular incidence only because it happens to be a 
highly specialized situation in which our theory of belief 
may be of help to people who may need to decide about 
their beliefs. Consider the following question. Suppose 
we are in a situation in which we just obtained the second 
piece of evidence (say, the existence of military 
communications between the bunker and elsewhere, 
denoted as "E = Yes"). Should our confidence in 
entertaining the belief that the bunker is a military bunker 
be raised significantly? Of course, by asking this 
question, we are assuming that we have already obtained 
the first piece of evidence (i.e., satellite photographs 
showing military personnels going into and out of the 
bunker, denoted as "P = Yes"), and that based on this first 
piece of evidence, we have decided that our intuitions 
satisfy Bel([M] I [P]) = c and Bel( ..,M]I [P]) = 0, where M 
(= Yes) stands for "the bunker is used for military 
purposes." In other words, given the first piece of 
evidence, we will not be surprised if it turns out that the 
bunker is for military purposes, and we will be somewhat 
surprised (to the extent c) if it turns out that the bunker is 
a civilian shelter (we assume that a bunker is either a 
military bunker or a civilian shelter). The same thing can 
be said about the second piece of evidence. That is, we 
may decide that our intuitions satisfy Bei([M] I [E]) = d 
and BeJ(..,M]I [E]) = 0. The question, however, is what 
we should decide about Bei([M] I [P" E]) and Bel([-,M] I 
[P" E]). 
As a first step of the analysis, we let X= {M, P, E), and 
the constraints we have for the moment are the following: 
Bei([M] I  [P]) = c, Bel(-,Mll [P]) = 0, Bei([M) I [E]) = d, 
and Bei(-,M] I [E]) = 0. Let us now try to add more 
constraints to this set. First, our intuitions may be such 
that Bel([M]) = 0, Bel([-,M]) = 0, Bel([P]) = 0, Bei((..,P]) = 
0, Bei([E]) = 0, and Bel([-,E]) = 0. That is, we do not 
entertain any belief regarding the bunker (at least we try to 
be so), whether it is a belief regarding what the bunker is 
for, a belief regarding whether the satellite photographs 
will show military personnels going into and out of the 
bunker, or a belief regarding whether there exists any 
military communication between the bunker and 
elsewhere. These "vacuous priors" are, in effect, the kinds 
of "attitudes" we usually try to enforce upon ourselves 
when performing evidential reasoning. Adding these six 
constraints to the original set of constraints, we now have 
a total of ten constraints that have to be satisfied. 
Can we do better (in adding more constraints)? It happens 
that in this particular case, we can. Because our intuitions 
are also such that Bel([M => Pl) = I and Bel([M :::> El) = I 
are satisfied. So, altogether, we now have twelve 
constraints to be satisfied: Bel([M] I [Pl) = c, Bel( -,M] I 
[Pl) = 0, Bel([M]I [El) = d, Bel(-,Mll [E]) = 0, Bel([M]) 
= 0, Bel([-,Ml) = 0, Bel([Pl) = 0, Bel([-,Pl) = 0, Bel([El) = 
0, Bel([-,El) = 0, Bel([M :::> Pl) = 1 and Bel([M => El) = I. 
Next question is guaranteed to be a thorny one: do our 
intuitions satisfy Bel([-,P] I [-,M]) = c and Bel([-,E] I 
[-,Ml) = d? In other words, given that the bunker is a 
civilian shelter, will we be surprised (to the extent c) upon 
seeing military personnels going into and out of the 
bunker? Similarly, given that the bunker is a civilian 
shelter, will we be surprised (to the extent d) upon 
intercepting military communications between the bunker 
and elsewhere? To answer these two questions, we need to 
step back and think: why do our intuitions satisfy Bel([M] 
I [Pl) = c (or Bel([M] I [El) = d) in the frrst place? Well, 
our intuitions satisfy Bel([M]I [P]) = c because, given the 
only information that there were military personnels 
going into and out of the bunker, we are confident (to the 
extent c) in thinking that other reasons of why there were 
military personnels in presence can be ruled out (and that 
the reason of P's being true is because the bunker is for 
military purposes). Now, if upon learning that the bunker 
is a civilian shelter, we are still this confident (to the 
extent c) in thinking that other possible causes of the 
presence of military personnels can be ruled out, then we 
are certainly entitled to the expectation (with c being the 
corresponding confidence in having the expectation) that 
there will not be military personnels going into and out of 
the bunker. The same thing can be said about Bel([M] I 
[E]) and Bel([-,E] I [-,Ml). Note that we are not 
suggesting that contrapositions are always satisfied. What 
we are suggesting is that contrapositions are not all that 
unreasonable as far as evidential reasoning from the 
perspectives of surprise is concerned. In fact, for this 
particular example, we tend to accept contrapositions here. 
Just think: wouldn't you be surprised (to the extent d) if 
given the only information that the bunker is a civilian 
shelter, you later intercept military communications 
between the bunker and elsewhere? (Remember that you 
already agreed that, given the only information that you 
intercepted military communications between the bunker 
and elsewhere, you will be surprised to the extent d if you 
later learn that it is a civilian shelter.) 
Now back to the example. Adding the two 
contrapositions (i.e., Bel([-,PJI [-,Ml) = c and Bel([-,E]I 
[-,M]) = d) to our set of constraints, we now have fourteen 
in the set. If we are able to add two additional 
independence constraints into this set, then it can be 
shown [Hsia, 199lb] that, given that both P and E are 
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true, we are entitled to a significantly higher confidence in 
entertaining the belief that M is true. (In effect, this 
increase is due to the fact that Dempster's rule of 
combination happens to be what we get when we try to 
satisfy all sixteen constraints.) But unfortunately, this is 
where the example fails to satisfy. 
The two constraints that are in need here are: Bel([-,P] I 
[-,M]) = Bel([-,P] I [-,M " El) and Bel([-,E] I [-,Ml) = 
Bel([-,E] I [-,M " P]). What they mean is as follows. 
Suppose the bunker is a civilian shelter. Then since we 
accept contraposition here, we will be surprised (to the 
extent c) upon seeing military personnels going into and 
out of the bunker. Nevertheless, suppose the bunker is a 
civilian shelter and we also intercepted military 
communications between the bunker and elsewhere, then 
we (probably) will be less surprised upon seeing military 
personnels going into and out of the bunker, as something 
fishy may be going on. The same thing can be said about 
Bel([-,E] I [-,Ml) and Bel([-,E] I [-,M " P]). In other 
words, our intuitions do not satisfy Bel([-,P] I [...,Ml) = 
Bel([-,P] I [-,M " El) and Bel([-,E] I [-,M]) = Bel([-,E] I 
[-,M " P]). Thus, our theory can only stop here, as we 
lack the necessary ingredients to significantly raise the 
user's degree of confidence in entertaining the belief that 
M is true. In some sense, this suggests that we ought not 
make Bcl([M] I [P " E]) significantly higher than 
Bel([MJI [Pl) or Bel([MJI [El). 
4 DIS CUSSION 
When Shafer introduced the theory of belief functions in 
his 1976 monograph, he had the intention of viewing his 
theory as a generalization of the Bayesian theory of 
subjective probability. That is, Shafer's notion of belief 
is basically what we call a "graded" concept of entertaining 
a belief, and he was, as Fagin and Halpern [1989] 
observed, extending the Bayesian view of belief from 
measurable sets to nonmeasurable sets. Smets [1988] 
also used belief functions to develop a notion of belief 
along a similar line. Thus, we should not be surprised to 
see that most of the interpretations of belief functions 
(e.g., [Black, 1987; Halpern and Fagin, 1990; Kyburg, 
1987; Laskey and Lehner, 1989; Nguyen 1978; Pearl, 
1988, chapter 9; Shafer and Tversky, 1985]) relate belief 
functions to probability theory in some way. In other 
words, all these interpretations share the common goal of 
trying to generalize the Bayesian view of belief. 
Our approach here is completely different We start with 
an entirely different view of (human) belief, and we 
"happen" to settle on the use of belief functions to 
implement (if you will) our particular view of belief. 
Thus, our theory of belief is (intuitively) not  a 
generalization of the Bayesian theory, though formally we 
cannot deny the fact that probabilities happen to be a 
special kind of belief functions. In other words, to use 
our theory of belief for uncertain reasoning, it has to be 
the case that the user finds our view of belief attractive 
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(and, as a result, wants to adopt it), and it should not be 
the case that the user considers our theory of belief a 
generalization of the Bayesian theory of belief (as it would 
then be an outright mistake). So if the question is "why 
should I use your theory of belief for uncertain 
reasoning?", then the answer would be "because you agree 
with us in thinking that the notion of belief consists in 
entertaining various beliefs with various degrees of 
confidence." 
Up until now, we have maintained that belief functions 
may be viewed as a very general mechanism for 
formalizing the notion of surprise. In effect, this just 
means that we want to keep the versatility of belief 
functions at our disposal. However, this does not mean 
that we will always need all the versatility of belief 
functions when we try to formalize our intuitive notion of 
surprise associated with some domain. In fact, it may be 
quite desirable (and also feasible) to impose special 
constraints when dealing with special domains. For 
example, in formalizing highly specialized expertise with 
regards to well-defined domains, we may only need to 
consider consonant belief functions.6 And when this is 
the case, we may then relate belief functions to possibility 
theory [Dubois and Prade, 1990], as the necessity measure 
of a possibility is formally equivalent to Bel when Bel is 
a consonant belief function [Dubois and Prade, 1988). 
Similarly, in formalizing common sense, we may only 
need to consider conjunctive belief functions [Hsia, 
1991c).7 This, in tum, may permit us to make purely 
qualitative inferences in a logical framework. 
In short, belief functions may be "customized" in various 
ways to permit more efficient specifications as well as 
inferences. It all depends on whether our domain-of­
interest allows us to impose such restrictions. 
S CONCLUSION 
There is not just one view of human belief. There are at 
least two views: one that embodies a graded concept of 
believing in something, and the other that embodies the 
view of entertaining a belief with some degree of 
confidence. We can of course adopt the view that we 
always believe in something to a certain extent, in which 
case we (most likely) would arrive at the Bayesian theory 
of belief - a theory that has enjoyed a long history of 
research and development. On the other hand, we can also 
adopt the view that we entertain beliefs with various 
degrees of confidence, in which case we would arrive at 
6 A belief function Bel is consonant if we can arrange the 
focal elements of Bel in a sequence so that each is contained 
in the following one. 
1 A belief function Bel is conjunctive if 1:1 A c;;; 8, 1:1 B c;;; 
8, 1:1 C c;;; 8, if Bel(A I B)> 0 and Bel(8\A I B)� 0 and Bel(C I 
B) > 0 and Bel(8\C I B) = 0, then Bel(AnC I B) > 0 and 
Bel(8\(AnC) I B)= 0. 
our current theory of belief. The two views of belief are 
equally valid (or rather, neither is more "true" than the 
other). So which view of belief should we adopt? It is, 
very simply put, anyone's choice. 
We set out to develop our theory of belief for the 
following reason. Surprise is something that has to do 
with how we reason and what we actually observe in our 
everyday life. It is an intuitive concept that we may feel 
quite comfortable in assessing its value. Therefore, by 
adopting the view of belief we advocate in this paper, we 
can, in effect, capture the notion of belief using our 
measured degrees of surprise. Ultimately, this may 
contribute to efforts in the area of "approximating human 
expertise with the use of computers," also known as 
artificial intelligence. 
In introducing our theory, we have described a canonical 
measurement device that can be used for the measurement 
of surprise (and thus belief), and we have suggested the 
use of belief functions as a very general mechanism for 
modeling our notion of belief. As an illustration of how 
our theory of belief may be of some help to people who 
need to decide about their beliefs, we also gave an example 
in (boolean and abductive) evidential reasoning. Unlike 
probability theory which enjoys a wide spectrum of 
results and applications, our enterprise of surprise and 
belief is still at the beginning of its development, and we 
still need to do (much) more work in order to make this 
enterprise truly accessible to practitioners of uncertain 
reasoning. 
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Appendix • logical formulas and subsets of 9 
Let Xt. X2, ... , XN be variables and 81, 82, ... , 9N be 
their respective frames. Xi is boolean if 9i = (Yes, No). 
Let 9 = 81 X 82 X • • •  X 9N. By the "Xi-value" (1 � i � 
N) of an element <a1, a2, ... , aN> of 9, we mean ai. Let 
x E 9 and a E 9i (1 � i � N), we recursively define what 
a formula f is and whether x satisfies the formula f below. 
Case 1. f is "Xi = a": x satisfies f if and only if the Xi-
value of x is a. ("Xi" is also used as a 
shorthand for "Xi = Yes" in the case of boolean 
variables.) 
Case 2. f is "--,g", where g is a formula: x satisfies f if 
and only if x does not satisfy g. 
Case 3. f is "g v h", where g and h are formulas: x 
satisfies f if and only if x satisfies at least one 
of g and h. 
Case 4. f is "g " h", where g and h are formulas: x 
satisfies f if and only if x satisfies the formula 
"--,(--,g v -,h)". 
Case 5. f is "g ::J h", where g and h are formulas: x 
satisfies f if and only if x satisfies the formula 11-,g v h". 
Let f be a formula. By the subset (of 8) the formula f 
refers to (or, alternatively, the subset (of 8) the formula! 
corresponds to), we mean the set {x: x E 8 and x satisfies 
f). denoted as [f]. 
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